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Public Perceptions of Government Speech
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette1
December 18, 2017
The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly in recent years that the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause “does not regulate government speech.”2
While in most circumstances the government must adhere to a requirement of
“viewpoint neutrality” in its regulation of private speech,3 the government is
subject to no such requirement when it engages in speech of its own. Thus, a
public school cannot prohibit students from expressing anti-war views,4 but the
government is free to propagate its own messages in support of a war effort.5
Likewise, a city generally cannot ban neo-Nazis from marching through its
streets,6 but it can issue its own condemnation of fascism. The rule that the
government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”7 does not
require the government to remain on the sidelines in public debates.
Although the proposition that the government need not remain
viewpoint-neutral in its own speech is clear, the line between “government
speech” and private expression is often fuzzy. Consider just a few of the recent
cases in which federal courts have wrestled with this question. Does a
temporary exhibit on the ground floor of the state capitol constitute
government speech or private speech? (A federal district court recently ruled
that such exhibits are private speech, and thus Texas could not prohibit a
secularist group from displaying a banner inside that state’s capitol that
declared “[t]here are no gods . . . .”8) What about visitors’ guides displayed and
distributed by a private publisher at highway rest areas operated by a state
agency? (The Fourth Circuit recently held that these guides are government
speech, and thus the Virginia Department of Transportation could insist on
exercising editorial control over the guides.9) And does a public university

1 Daniel Hemel is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.
Lisa Ouellette is an Associate Professor of Law at Stanford Law School.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: Thanks to Joseph Blocher, Doron Dorfman, Mark Lemley, Helen
Norton, Geoffrey Stone, and Eugene Volokh for helpful comments.
2 Matal v Tam, 137 S Ct 1744, 1757 (2017); Pleasant Grove City v Summum, 555 US 460, 467
(2009); see Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S Ct 2239, 2255 (2015)
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the
content of what it says.”).
3 See, for example, Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 US 819, 834
(1995); Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95–96 (1972).
4 See Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503 (1968).
5 See Matal, 137 S Ct at 1758.
6 See Collin v Smith, 578 F2d 1197 (7th Cir 1978), cert denied, 439 US 916.
7 US Const Amend I.
8 See Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v Abbott, 2016 WL 7388401, *2, 4–5 (WD Tex).
9 See Vista-Graphics, Inc. v Virginia Department of Transportation, 682 Fed Appx 231, 236–37 (4th
Cir 2017).
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engage in government speech when it permits student organizations to use its
trademarked name and logo on T-shirts? (The Eighth Circuit recently
answered that question in the negative, holding that Iowa State University
could not prevent a student group supporting marijuana legalization from
using the school’s name and logo on merchandise when it granted such
permission to other student organizations.10)
The stakes of the debate are enormous. In the context of any particular
case, the question of whether expression constitutes government speech or
private speech often will determine the outcome. And over the landscape of
First Amendment law, the government-versus-private-speech question looms
large. If all government speech were subject to the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement, public administration would be paralyzed: a city could not so
much as erect a sign saying “STOP” without adding one that says “GO.” Yet
without some meaningful limit on the government’s ability to claim expression
as its own, the government speech doctrine could eviscerate the bar on
viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.
To draw the line between government speech and private expression,
the Supreme Court’s early government speech cases looked to whether the
speaker is a “traditional” government agency or official11 and to whether the
government exercises “control over the message.”12 In the past decade,
however, the Court has placed increasing emphasis on whether members of the
public reasonably perceive the relevant expression to be government speech.
One justice has gone so far as to suggest that this factor should be the sole
criterion for distinguishing government speech from private expression.13
This new emphasis on public perception has manifested itself in the
Court’s three most recent government speech cases. In 2009, the Court
unanimously held in Pleasant Grove City v Summum that privately donated
monuments in a city park constitute government speech in part because
“persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—
interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”14
Six years later, in Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, the Court
split 5–4 as to whether specialty license plate designs submitted by private
organizations qualify as “government speech,” with the majority and dissent
disagreeing as to whether members of the public would perceive the license
plates to convey a message on the State of Texas’s behalf.15 And this past
See Gerlich v Leath, 861 F3d 697, 712–14 (8th Cir 2017).
See Keller v State Bar of California, 496 US 1, 13 (1990).
12 See Johanns v Livestock Marketing Association, 544 US 550, 561 (2005).
13 See Summum, 555 US at 487 (Souter, J, concurring in the judgment).
14 555 US at 471.
15 Compare Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct at 2249 (“Texas license plates are,
essentially, government IDs. . . . [P]ersons who observe designs on IDs routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the issuer’s behalf.” (alterations and
quotation marks omitted)), with id at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting) (“[W]ould you really think that
the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not
those of the owners of the cars?”).
10
11
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Term, in Matal v Tam, the Court held that federal registration of trademarks is
not government speech because (among other factors) “there is no evidence
that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal
Government.”16
The Supreme Court’s turn toward public perception as an oftendeterminative factor in government speech cases is, we think, a welcome
development. Government intervention in the marketplace of ideas is
especially dangerous when it is nontransparent. In such instances, government
officials potentially can launder messages through the mouths of private
speakers and escape electoral accountability for that expression. If government
officials want to escape the viewpoint-neutrality requirement that is generally
applicable to speech regulation, they should—we think—have to claim those
messages as their own.
But while there are strong theoretical reasons to draw the line between
government speech and private speech on the basis of public perception, the
Court has so far failed to develop a reliable method for determining whether
the public perceives expression to be government speech. The Court’s
statement in Summum that members of the public “routinely” interpret
monuments on government land as government speech rested on nothing
more than ipse dixit. The majority’s conclusion in Sons of Confederate Veterans that
observers understand specialty license plate designs to be government speech
similarly relied on judicial assertion. Most recently, the Court in Tam seized on
the absence of any evidence that the public associates the content of
trademarks with the government but ignored the fact that there was no
evidence in the other direction either.
It does not have to be this way. Courts can do better than relying on
armchair speculation to determine whether members of the public attribute
expression to the government. And in other contexts, courts do. Most notably,
courts in trademark infringement cases often consult consumer surveys to
determine whether the defendant’s use is likely to cause confusion related to
the plaintiff’s mark17—in other words, whether the defendant’s use causes
consumers to misattribute a product or message to the plaintiff. The
acceptance of survey evidence in trademark law reflects a recognition that
empirical claims regarding consumer psychology are better supported through
quantitative social science than through judicial guesswork.
The argument for resorting to survey evidence applies with similar
force in the government speech context. As noted, government speech cases,
like trademark infringement cases, often come down to how judges or justices
expect the public to react to certain stimuli. And as in the trademark context,
judicial speculation is likely to be biased and inaccurate. If the worry is that
members of the public will perceive private speech to be government speech or
government speech to be private speech, then it would seem that the best way
137 S Ct at 1760.
J. Thomas McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 23:1, 32:158
(Thomson Reuters 5th ed 2017).
16
17
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to resolve the worry is to ask a representative sample of the population. This is
not to say that survey results should be dispositive in government speech cases,
just as survey results are not dispositive in the trademark infringement
context.18 But as in the trademark infringement context, survey evidence can
play an important role in validating and falsifying claims regarding public
perceptions as to the source of arguably-government speech.
This article lays out the argument for using survey evidence in
government speech cases.19 We supplement our normative argument with a
proof of concept: a survey of a nationally representative sample of more than
1200 respondents whose views on government speech we gauged. Some of the
speculative claims made by the justices in recent government speech cases are
borne out by our survey: for example, we find that members of the public do
routinely interpret monuments on government land as conveying a message on
the government’s behalf. In other respects, however, the justices’ speculation
proves less accurate: for instance, while the Court in Tam says that it is “farfetched” to suggest that “the federal registration of a trademark makes the
mark government speech,”20 we find that nearly half of respondents hold this
“far-fetched” view.
We further find that respondents are somewhat more likely to attribute
messages to the government if they agree with those messages themselves. For
example, individuals are more likely to attribute pro-choice messages to the
government if they hold pro-choice views, and individuals are more likely to
attribute atheistic messages to the government if they have positive attitudes
toward atheism. One possible interpretation of this finding might be that courts
should not rely on public perception in government speech cases because doing
so will favor already-popular beliefs while disadvantaging minority views. Our
interpretation is different. In determining whether expression constitutes
government speech, members of the Court as well as members of the public
inevitably are affected by both the medium of expression and the content of the
message. Survey experiments such as the one we conducted here can be useful
in disentangling the effects of medium from the effects of message because the
controlled setting allows researchers to vary the message while holding medium
constant. Thus, survey experiments can reduce the risk that government
speech doctrine will systematically favor some views over others.
See id § 32:158 (cited in note 17).
The idea of using trademark-like consumer surveys in the government speech context is
mentioned by Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88
BU L Rev 587, 611–13 (2008). Norton does not, however, explain how the idea might be
implemented in practice. She notes the “vexing question of what number or percentage of
onlookers need to identify a message’s source as governmental,” and adds that “[f]ixing the
number with any principled specificity poses substantial challenges.” Id at 613. Some of these
practical issues were addressed by Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured
Endorsement, 60 Md L Rev 713 (2001), although their work focused on survey evidence in
Establishment Clause cases and predated the general acceptance of online surveys. Building on
the insights of these earlier authors, we provide the first empirical demonstration of how a
government speech survey might work in practice and address counterarguments beyond the
difficulty in implementation.
20 137 S Ct at 1748.
18
19
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To be sure, the use of survey evidence in government speech cases
raises a number of implementation issues that require careful thought. For
example, parties might manipulate surveys to support their views, forcing the
court to resolve disputes about social science methodologies. But the current
approach of armchair speculation is even more manipulable, and courts
already evaluate social science methodologies in the trademark survey context
as well as many others. Another challenge relates to line-drawing: what
percentage of the public must perceive expression to be government speech for
it to qualify as such? Rather than proposing a specific numerical threshold, we
suggest that the best approach is to compare with controls—i.e., to test against
expression that any court would (or would not) consider to be government
speech. The use of such comparisons can allow courts to assess whether
members of the public perceive particular instances of gray-area expression—
messages that are arguably but not certainly government speech—more like
paradigmatic examples of government speech (e.g., the engravings on the
Lincoln Memorial) or more like paradigmatic examples of private expression
(e.g., billboards on privately owned property).
We address these and other concerns at further length below. Our
reflection on implementation challenges underscores the broader point that
government speech doctrine ought not be outsourced to a mechanical test.
Using survey evidence to inform government speech doctrine does not obviate
the need for judges to apply their own experience and expertise—as well as
legal and prudential reasoning—in the context of individual cases. Our more
limited claim is that the ability of courts to resolve government speech cases
will be aided by more rigorous evidence of how the public actually perceives
the kinds of expression at issue.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the rise of public
perception as a factor in government speech cases and considers whether this
doctrinal development is a desirable one. We argue that it is, but that the
Court’s government speech jurisprudence would be enriched by consulting
survey evidence as a measure of public perception. Part II explains the
structure of our survey—which draws from the facts of Summum, Sons of
Confederate Veterans, and Tam—and presents our results. Part III considers the
doctrinal and normative implications of our findings. We conclude that the use
of survey evidence can reduce the arbitrariness inherent in the Court’s current
approach to the public perception factor in government speech cases while also
mitigating the pervasive concern that the extension of government speech
doctrine to messages produced by private parties will eviscerate First
Amendment protections.

I. Relevance of Public Perceptions of Government Speech
We begin with a brief history of the Supreme Court’s government
speech doctrine and the role of the public perception factor in the Court’s
cases. We then consider and respond to criticism of the Court’s turn toward
public perception as a factor distinguishing government speech from private
expression. We ultimately conclude that public perception should matter—
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perhaps more than any other factor—in deciding whether expression qualifies
as government speech, and that survey evidence can aid the Court in
determining whether members of the public perceive speech as coming from
the government.

A. Doctrinal Roots
1. Origins and Purposes of the Government Speech Doctrine
The phrase “government speech” is nowhere to be found in the first
200 years of Supreme Court opinions. In part this may be attributable to the
fact that viewpoint neutrality is itself a relatively young doctrine—only in the
mid-1930s did the Court start to take seriously the notion that the First
Amendment prevents the government from restricting private expression on
the basis of viewpoint.21 Yet several more decades passed before the Court first
made reference to the “so-called ‘government speech’ doctrine” in the 1990
case of Keller v State Bar of California.22 In that case, a group of California
attorneys argued that the State Bar violated their free speech rights by using
compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which they
disagreed. The Bar responded that—as a government entity speaking on its
own behalf—it was exempt from normal Free Speech Clause scrutiny.23 The
Court implicitly accepted the State Bar’s argument that government entities
are subject to a different Free Speech Clause standard. According to the Court:
Government officials are expected as a part of the democratic
process to represent and to espouse the views of a majority of
their constituents. With countless advocates outside of the
government seeking to influence its policy, it would be ironic if
those charged with making governmental decisions were not
free to speak for themselves in the process. If every citizen were
to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express
a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically
transformed.24

21 On the evolution of the Court’s viewpoint-neutrality doctrine, see Paul B. Stephan III,
The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 Va L Rev 203, 215–18 (1982).
22 496 US 1 (1990). Justices made passing reference to “government speech” in two
Establishment Clause cases decided shortly before Keller. See County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US
573, 661, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Board of Education v Mergens, 496 US 226, 250 (1990). Justice Stewart arguably anticipated the
modern-day government speech doctrine in a footnote to a concurring opinion in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic National Committee, 412 US 94, 132 (1973), but he spoke there
only for himself and not for the Court. See id at 139 n 7 (Stewart, J, concurring)
(“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression.”).
23 Keller, 496 US at 10–11.
24 Id at 12–13.
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The Court in Keller ultimately concluded that the government speech
doctrine did not apply in that case because “the very specialized characteristics
of the State Bar . . . distinguish it from the role of the typical government
official or agency.”25 But in the process of shooting down the State Bar’s
government speech argument, the Court gave rise to a doctrine that, according
to one eminent analyst, would soon threaten “to swallow much of the First
Amendment’s protections.”26
As the government speech doctrine has evolved from dicta in Keller to
ratio decidendi in later cases, the Court’s rationale for the doctrine has evolved as
well. The justification offered in Keller—that the doctrine is needed so that
government officials can “speak for themselves”—has given way to two other
arguments in favor of a Free Speech Clause exemption for government speech.
First, the justices have said that “it is not easy to imagine how
government could function” if government speech were subject to Free Speech
Clause scrutiny—and, in particular, the requirement that the government
maintain viewpoint neutrality in its regulation of speech.27 As Justice Scalia
observed in Rust v Sullivan, a viewpoint-neutrality requirement for government
speech would mean that when Congress established the National Endowment
for Democracy, it also would have been “constitutionally required to fund a
program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as
communism and fascism.”28 Or as Justice Breyer put the point in Sons of
Confederate Veterans: “How could a city government create a successful recycling
program if officials, when writing householders asking them to recycle cans and
bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the local trash disposal
enterprise demanding the contrary?”29 And as Justice Alito piled on in Tam, a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement would suggest that “[d]uring the Second
World War,” when “the Federal Government produced and distributed
millions of posters . . . urging enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and the
conservation of scarce resources,” it also needed to “balance the
message . . . by producing and distributing posters encouraging Americans to
refrain from engaging in these activities.”30 This line of reductio ad absurdum
argument is meant to establish that the Free Speech Clause could not possibly
apply to the government’s own speech.
Second, the justices have suggested that the government has an interest
in disassociating itself from speech that it does not endorse. This interest in
disassociation and the avoidance of misattribution appears somewhat obliquely
in Summum, where Justice Alito notes that it is “not common for property
owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments
Id at 12.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 Fed Communications L J
579, 586 (2010); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Troubling Government Speech Doctrine, ACS Blog
(June 19, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-troubling-government-speech-doctrine.
27 Summum, 555 US at 468; Tam, 137 S Ct at 1757.
28 500 US 173, 194 (1991).
29 135 S Ct at 2246.
30 137 S Ct at 1758.
25
26
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that convey a message with which they do not wish to be associated.”31 (Justice
Breyer makes essentially the same observation with respect to state-issued
license plates in Sons of Confederate Veterans.32) The point comes through more
clearly in several of the Court’s earlier cases involving forum doctrine33 and the
regulation of speech in public schools.34
The two arguments are related: The government’s interest in
supporting the spread of democracy and not communism or fascism is based
both on a programmatic rationale (equal financing for communism and fascism
would undermine the government’s pro-democracy objective) and a
disassociation rationale (the government does not want communist or fascist
views to be attributed to it). And most would agree that both arguments have
some merit. Of course the government should be able to say “Get Your Flu
Shot” without adding “Beware of Vaccines.” Of course it should be able to tell
motorists to “Slow for Pedestrians” without adding “Speed Up.” The challenge
is to delineate the boundaries of the government speech doctrine so as to leave
space for non-neutral government speech without at the same time
“swallow[ing] much of the First Amendment’s protections.”35
2. Drawing the Line Between Government and Private Speech
In Keller, the justices appear to have assumed that the “so-called
‘government speech’ doctrine” that they had minted would apply only to the
555 US at 471.
135 S Ct at 2249, quoting id.
33 See Lehman v City of Shaker Heights, 418 US 298, 304 (1974) (interest in “minimiz[ing] . . .
the appearance of favoritism” supports city’s decision to ban political advertisements on public
buses); Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 839 (1976) (ban on speeches and demonstrations of a partisan
nature on military base supported by military’s interest in being “insulated from both the
reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or
candidates”); Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 473 US 788, 809 (1985) (interest
in avoiding “appearance of favoritism” supports exclusion of legal defense and political
advocacy organizations from federal employees’ charity drive).
34 See, for example, Bethel School District v Fraser, 478 US 675, 685–86 (1986) (“perfectly
appropriate” for high school “to disassociate itself” from student’s lewd speech at school
assembly—and to suspend student for three days—“to make the point to the pupils that vulgar
speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental values of public school
education” (quotation marks omitted)); Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 271
(1988) (“[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a
school play disassociate itself not only from speech that would substantially interfere with its
work or impinge upon the rights of other students, but also from speech that is, for example,
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences” (alterations, citations, and quotation marks
omitted)). For an overview, see Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 Den U L Rev 833, 848–53
(2010).
35 Chemerinsky, 63 Fed Communications L J at 586 (cited in note 26); see also Joseph
Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 BC L Rev 695 (2011) (“Has government
speech doctrine undermined the First Amendment’s seemingly inviolable viewpoint neutrality
requirement?”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 Nw U L Rev 1195, 1216
(2016) (“Walker’s expensive view of government speech doctrine grants state actors broad
authority to restrict private speech.”).
31
32
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messages of “traditional government agencies and officials.”36 Thus, even
though California’s highest court had accorded “governmental” status to the
State Bar, the Bar’s speech was not “government speech” for First Amendment
purposes. The Court noted three factors that distinguish the Bar from “most
other entities that would be regarded in common parlance as ‘government
agencies’”: its principal funding comes from dues levied on members; all
lawyers admitted to practice in California must be members; and the state
supreme court rather than the Bar has final authority over admission,
suspension, disbarment, and the establishment of ethical codes of conduct.37
The Keller Court’s line between “traditional government agencies and
officials,” to whom the government speech doctrine would apply, and quasigovernmental entities such as the State Bar, to whom it would not, did not hold
for long. The very next Term, in Rust v Sullivan, the Court upheld a regulation
that prohibited certain federally funded organizations from using federal
dollars to provide abortion-related counseling or otherwise to promote
abortion as a method of family planning.38 The Court did not dwell on the fact
that the doctors and nonprofit organizations whose speech was being regulated
in Rust were not in any sense traditional government agencies or officials.
Indeed, the Court did not cite Keller at all. Instead, it said “when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program,” it is
“entitled”—within broad limits—“to define the limits of that program,”
including limits on what recipients of program funds can and cannot say.39
But the Court would soon come to rethink Rust’s sweeping language. In
Legal Services Corporation v Velasquez,40 the Court considered the validity of an
appropriations provision that barred legal aid attorneys who received federal
funding from challenging state welfare laws on federal statutory or
constitutional grounds. One might be excused for thinking that this would be
an easy case under Rust: when the government appropriates public funds to
establish a program, it is generally entitled to define the limits of that program.
Not so. The Court in Velasquez said that a legal aid attorney “is not the
government’s speaker,” and that “[t]he advice from the attorney to the client
and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as
governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the concept.”41
The Court failed to explain why a doctor’s advice to a patient and an
attorney’s advice to a client would be classified differently for First Amendment
purposes, with the former falling within the government speech doctrine’s
scope and the latter landing beyond.
The Court’s implicit rejection of Rust did not, however, signify a return
to Keller’s “traditional government agencies and officials” standard. Nor would
Keller, 496 US at 13.
See id at 11–12.
38 500 US 173 (1991).
39 Id at 194.
40 531 US 533 (2001).
41 Id at 542–43.
36
37
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it lead immediately to the Court adopting public perception as a factor in
government speech analysis. Indeed, in Johanns v Livestock Marketing Association,42
a 2005 case, a majority of the Court explicitly rejected the notion that public
perception had any relevance to whether expression constitutes government
speech.
Johanns involved a First Amendment challenge to a federal law
requiring beef producers and importers to pay a $1 per head assessment on
cattle sales to fund beef promotional campaigns conceived by a 20-person
committee. Half the committee’s members were appointed by the Secretary of
Agriculture; half were chosen by a beef industry group. Beef producers who
objected to the mandatory assessment argued that the per-head assessment
compelled them to subsidize private speech with which they disagreed.
The Court—in an opinion by Justice Scalia—rejected the dissident beef
producers’ argument, holding that the beef promotional campaigns constitute
government speech. The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the
substantial similarities between the 20-member committee running the beef ad
campaigns and the State Bar in Keller. In both cases, the organization’s
principal funding came from assessments on industry participants, who
comprised its members.43 In both cases, the organization’s actions were subject
to the approval of another government actor (in Keller, the state Supreme
Court; in Johanns, the Agriculture Secretary44). And yet in Keller, these “very
specialized characteristics of the State Bar of California . . . served to
distinguish it from the role of the typical government official or agency” for
First Amendment purposes,45 whereas the Court in Johanns concluded that the
ads produced by the 20-member committee constituted government speech.
What “distinguishes [Johanns] from Keller,” according to the Court, is
the “degree of governmental control over the message funded by the [beef]
checkoff.”46 Congress described in broad brushstrokes the objective of the
promotional efforts, and the Agriculture Secretary “exercises final approval
authority over every word used in every promotional campaign.”47 This, in the
majority’s view, was enough to make the beef ads government speech. “The
message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message
established by the Federal Government,” Justice Scalia said.48 This holds true,
in the Court’s view, notwithstanding the fact that the government “solicits
assistance from nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages.”49
That a message is “from beginning to end” established by the federal
government does not, however, appear to be a necessary criterion for
544 US 550 (2005).
Compare Keller, 496 US at 11, with Johanns, 544 US at 554.
44 Compare Keller, 496 US at 11–12, with Johanns, 544 US at 563.
45 Keller, 496 US at 12.
46 544 US at 561.
47 See id at 561.
48 Id at 560.
49 Id at 562.
42
43
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classifying expression as government speech. After all, the government does not
exercise such control with respect to the doctor-patient communications that
came within the scope of the government speech doctrine in Rust. It is also
doubtful that this degree of government control is a sufficient condition for
expression to be classified as government speech: if, for example, the
government demanded to see and approve every litigation document produced
by a federally funded legal aid lawyer before it was filed, the First Amendment
violation in Legal Services Corporation v Velasquez would seem more egregious, not
less so.
Notably, in none of these early government speech cases did the
majority ask whether members of the public perceived the messages in question
to emanate from the government. Only Justice Souter, dissenting in Johanns,
suggested that public perception should be relevant to government speech
analysis. In his view, the government should not be able to rely on a
government speech defense “[u]nless the putative speech appears to be coming
from the government.”50 Otherwise, government officials would be able to
escape judicial scrutiny for their decisions to support certain expression while at
the same time “conceal[ing] their role from the voters with the power to hold
them accountable.”51
Yet a majority of the Court was not yet ready to endorse the idea that
public perception should matter to whether expression is classified as
government speech. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Johanns, said that
the beef ads at issue in that case constituted government speech “whether or
not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as the government’s.”52
The test for the validity of the beef program, according to Justice Scalia, “is not
on whether the ads’ audience realizes the Government is speaking, but on the
compelled assessment’s purported interference with [beef producers’] First
Amendment rights.”53
One-and-a-half decades into the Court’s experiment with a special First
Amendment exemption for government speech, then, the doctrine was in a
state of disarray. The distinction between “traditional” and nontraditional
government speeches and agencies had broken down. So too had Rust’s brightline rule allowing the legislature to define the limits of government-funded
programs. If there were any standard that could be discerned from Johanns, it
would be that expression constitutes government speech when “[t]he
message . . . is from beginning to end . . . established by the . . .

Id at 578–79 (Souter, J, dissenting).
Id at 578.
52 Id at 564 n 7 (majority opinion). “If a viewer would identify the speech as [the beef
producers’],” according to Justice Scalia, “the analysis would be different.” Id. That is, the Free
Speech Clause does—under Justice Scalia’s view—protect private individuals against the risk
that government speech will be misattributed to them. This latter concern fits within the
Court’s compelled speech framework but is separate from the government speech analysis. See
id at 565 n 8.
53 Id at 564 n 7.
50
51
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[g]overnment.”54 But as will soon be seen, the Court would quickly pedal back
from that “beginning to end” standard as well.
3. The Public Perception Trilogy
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has taken a new tack in its
government speech cases. The message-control criterion of Johanns has given
way to a new emphasis on public perception. This jurisprudential trend has
manifested itself in three cases so far.
a. Pleasant Grove City v Summum
The Court’s 2009 decision in Pleasant Grove City v Summum involved a
2.5-acre Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, that featured fifteen
permanent displays, eleven of which were donated by private individuals or
organizations. One of those was a Ten Commandments monument donated
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.55 Summum, a religious organization
headquartered in nearby Salt Lake City, sought permission to erect a similarly
sized stone monument presenting the “Seven Aphorisms” upon which the
Summum religion is based. The city rejected the request. Summum sued,
claiming that the city violated its free speech rights by allowing the Ten
Commandments monument but rejecting the Seven Aphorisms.56
The central question in Summum was whether privately donated
monuments on display in a public park qualify as government speech. If so,
then the city would be free to discriminate between the Ten Commandments
and the Seven Aphorisms. All the justices agreed that monuments in a public
park are government speech, and that the city could therefore accept the Ten
Commandments while rejecting Summum’s contribution.57
In explaining how the Court reached this conclusion, Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, emphasized the (apparent) fact that “persons who
observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as
conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”58 Thus, Justice Alito
saw “little chance that observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the
speaker.”59 As for why public perception should be a relevant factor in
government speech analysis, the only reason offered by Justice Alito was that
Id at 560.
555 US at 465.
56 See id at 464–66.
57 The Court noted that there are still restraints on government speech, such as that it
“must comport with the Establishment Clause.” Id at 468. Establishment Clause issues were
not raised in Summum, but the concurring opinions disagreed on whether they were settled.
Compare id at 482–83 (Scalia, J, concurring) (arguing that there is no Establishment Clause
violation), with id at 487 (Breyer, J, concurring) (“It is simply unclear how the relatively new
category of government speech will relate to the more traditional categories of Establishment
Clause analysis, and this case is not an occasion to speculate.”).
58 Id at 471 (majority opinion).
59 Id.
54
55
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municipal governments have an interest in controlling the messages they
convey internally and externally. “Public parks are often closely identified in
the public mind with the government unit that owns the land,” he wrote, and
selectivity allows a city to “defin[e] the identity that [it] projects to its own
residents and the outside world.”60
Public perception was not the only factor mentioned in the majority
opinion: Justice Alito also noted the long history of privately donated
monuments on public land61 as well as the space constraints that might prevent
public parks from accommodating all donations.62 Significantly, though, Justice
Alito did not say—as Justice Scalia had in Johanns—that the message in
question was controlled by the government “from beginning to end.” The
government’s role with respect to privately designed and donated monuments,
according to Justice Alito, is one of “selective receptivity”63 rather than
beginning-to-end editorial direction. Indeed, Justice Alito rejected the idea that
monuments might convey a discrete message within anyone’s control. As he
put it, “it frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is
conveyed by an object or structure,” and “the ‘message’ conveyed by a
monument may change over time.”64
While the majority in Summum placed greater emphasis on public
perception than the Court had in the past, Justice Souter went a step further
and argued in a concurring opinion that the sole test in cases such as Summum
should be “whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would
understand the expression to be government speech.”65 Justice Souter’s only
explanation for his proposed single-factor test was that it would “serve
coherence” by bringing the test for government speech in line with the test
employed in Establishment Clause cases “for spotting forbidden governmental
endorsement of religion.”66 Justice Souter also did not explain how a court
should determine whether “a reasonable and fully informed observer” would
understand privately donated monuments on public land to be government
speech—or even how he had reached that conclusion. He simply stated:
“Application of this observer test provides the reason I find the monument here
to be government expression.”67
b. Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans
The public perception factor played an even more prominent role in
Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, which involved a Texas
program that allowed private individuals and organizations to propose their
Id at 472.
See id at 471.
62 See id at 480.
63 Id at 471.
64 Id at 476–77.
65 Id at 487 (Souter, J, concurring in the judgment).
66 Id.
67 Id.
60
61
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own designs for state license plates. The state’s Department of Motor Vehicles
Board approved hundreds of such designs but rejected a proposal from the
Sons of Confederate Veterans for a plate that would feature the group’s name
and a Confederate battle flag image. The Sons of Confederate Veterans
claimed that the rejection of their proposed plate violated their free speech
rights.68
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that specialty license plates are
government speech, and that Texas was therefore free to choose which plates it
would and would not accept. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer
articulated a three-factor test for distinguishing government speech from
private expression. The first factor, “history,” looks to whether the relevant
medium has been used to communicate government messages in the past.69
The third factor, selectivity, looks to whether the government “maintains direct
control over the messages.”70 The middle factor is public perception: whether
“‘persons who observe’” the expressions in question “‘routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [government’s]
behalf.’”71
But how can a court know whether members of the public perceive
speech to be the government’s? Justice Breyer listed a number of considerations
with variable relevance to the inquiry at hand. For example, he highlighted the
fact that Texas law requires vehicle owners to display license plates, which—in
Justice Breyer’s view—strengthens the connection that observers will draw
between license plates and the state.72 But Texas also generally requires
individuals to wear pants or otherwise to cover their bottoms in public,73 and
this does not mean that pants are perceived to be government speech. Justice
Breyer also emphasized that “Texas dictates the manner in which drivers may
dispose of unused plates.”74 But Texas also dictates the manner in which tires
and untreated infectious waste may be disposed,75 and those items very
obviously do not constitute government speech.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Alito took issue with the majority’s
application of the public perception factor. “Here is a test,” Justice Alito wrote.
Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas highway and studied the
license plates on the vehicles passing by. You would see, in
addition to the standard Texas plates, an impressive array of
specialty plates. (There are now more than 350 varieties.) You
135 S Ct at 2243–45.
See id at 2248.
70 See id at 2249.
71 Id at 2248, quoting Summum, 555 US at 471.
72 Id.
73 See Tex Penal Code § 21.08.
74 135 S Ct at 2248.
75 See Northeast Recycling Council, Disposal Bans & Mandatory Recycling in the United States
134
(May
1,
2017),
at
https://nerc.org/documents/disposal_bans_mandatory_recycling_united_states.pdf.
68
69
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would likely observe plates that honor numerous colleges and
universities. You might see plates bearing the name of a high
school, a fraternity or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of
Columbus, the Daughters of the American Revolution, a realty
company, a favorite soft drink, a favorite burger restaurant, and
a favorite NASCAR driver. As you sat there watching these
plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments
reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of
Texas and not those of the owners of the cars?76
Justice Alito evidently would answer that question in the negative. But it
is not entirely clear why. After all, Justice Alito had said in Summum that “it
frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an
object or structure,”77 and yet the public may perceive that object or structure
to be government speech nonetheless. The fact that Texas specialty license
plates convey many different messages would not, under the logic of Summum,
seem to disqualify them from government speech status.
Justice Alito’s dissent appears to rest on the strong intuition that the
observer on the side of a Texas highway would perceive specialty license plates
to be government speech. But one wonders why Justice Alito is so confident in
his conclusion. Sitting by the side of a Texas highway and studying the license
plates on the vehicles passing by is not—we might surmise—a frequent pastime
of any of the justices (or, for that matter, their clerks). And yet the Court’s
increasing emphasis on the public perception factor seems to require the
justices to engage in these sorts of imaginative inquiries to determine the Free
Speech Clause’s scope.
c. Matal v Tam
The Court’s most recent government speech case, Matal v Tam, again
emphasized public perception as a factor distinguishing government speech
from private expression. Tam involved a rock band, “The Slants,” whose name
is a derogatory term for persons of Asian origin. The band’s members, who are
Asian-American, explained that they sought to “reclaim” the derogatory term.
When The Slants’ lead singer, Simon Tam, sought to register his band’s name
as a trademark, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected his
application on the basis of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits
registration of any mark that “may disparage . . . persons, living or dead.”78
Tam sought judicial review of the PTO’s decision and argued that the denial of
his application violated his free speech rights. The PTO argued in response
that federal registration of trademarks is a form of “government speech”
exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny.79

135 S Ct at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting) (paragraph break omitted).
Summum, 555 US at 478.
78 15 USC § 1052(a).
79 137 S Ct 1744, 1751–55 (2017).
76
77
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The Court roundly rejected the PTO’s government speech argument.
Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court on this point, said that it was “farfetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is government
speech.”80 According to Justice Alito:
If the federal registration of a trademark makes the mark
government speech, the Federal Government is babbling
prodigiously and incoherently. It is saying many unseemly
things. It is expressing contradictory views. It is unashamedly
endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services.
And it is providing Delphic advice to the consuming public. For
example, if trademarks represent government speech, what does
the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to
“make.believe” (Sony), “Think different” (Apple), “Just do it”
(Nike), or “Have it your way” (Burger King)? Was the
Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered
the mark “EndTime Ministries”?81
As in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Justice Alito seems to believe that the
incoherence of the messages conveyed by registered trademarks places these
expressions outside the bounds of government speech. And, also as in Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Justice Alito makes no effort to reconcile this position with
Summum’s conclusion that incoherence does not disqualify a monument as
government speech.
Moreover, while Justice Alito pays lip service to the “history” and
“selectivity” factors from Sons of Confederate Veterans,82 it is hard to put much
stock in his treatment of either factor. Justice Alito said that “[w]ith the
exception of the enforcement of [section 2(a) of the Lanham Act], the
viewpoint expressed by a mark has not played a role in the decision whether to
place it on the principal register.”83 But that same fact could just as easily
support the opposite conclusion: Ever since the Lanham Act was passed, the
Patent and Trademark Office has refused to register marks that it deems to be
disparaging toward “persons, living or dead.”84 And while one can criticize the
Patent and Trademark Office for being insufficiently selective in choosing
which marks to register, the PTO does reject somewhere around a quarter of
marks at the substantive review stage85—a figure that would seem to suggest
“selective receptivity.”
Ultimately, then, Justice Alito’s determination that federal registration
of trademarks is not government speech seems to come down to his strong
Id at 1758.
Id at 1758–59 (footnotes omitted). The Federal Circuit subsequently relied on this
conclusion when holding section 2(a)’s ban on “immoral” or “scandalous” marks to be
unconstitutional. In re Brunetti, 2017 WL 6391161, *13 (Fed Cir).
82 See id at 1760.
83 137 S Ct at 1760.
84 Act of July 5, 1946, ch 540, § 2(a), 60 Stat 427, 428.
85 Barton Beebe, Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp?, 48 Hous L Rev 751, 770–72 (2011).
80
81
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intuition—evidently shared by his colleagues—that the public perceives
trademarks to be private expression. But his test for what constitutes
government speech is no more determinate than Justice Stewart’s test for what
constitutes obscenity.86 Lower courts, government officials, and private parties
are left to guess how the Court will come out when the question arises in a new
context.

B. Evaluating the Role of Public Perception in Government
Speech Analysis
The Court’s government speech jurisprudence is easy to criticize—and
the Summum/Sons of Confederate Veterans/Tam trilogy is especially vulnerable. One
line of attack against the turn toward public perception argues that these
perceptions are disconnected from the normative justification for government
speech doctrine.87 A second line of attack focuses on the unpredictability and
malleability of the Court’s public perception analysis.88 We address these
concerns in turn.
1. Why Should Public Perception Matter?
Recall the reasons given by the Court for exempting government
speech from Free Speech Clause scrutiny. The Court in Keller argued that the
exemption enables government officials to participate in public debates, while
subsequent cases emphasize the programmatic importance of government
speech as well as the government’s interest in avoiding misattribution of private
expression to itself. As significant as these interests may be, they do little to
justify the use of the government speech doctrine to defeat free speech claims in
cases like Summum and Sons of Confederate Veterans, in which the relevant speech
was privately produced.
Consider first the Keller Court’s argument that allowing government
officials to express their positions without violating the Free Speech Clause
facilitates the participation of public officials in democratic debate. This seems
true enough, and leading academic commentators on government speech
doctrine generally agree with the claim.89 But the argument does not explain
why government speech principles ought to extend to cases such as Johanns,
See Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (“I know it when I see it . . . .”).
See, for example, Case Note, Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 129
Harv L Rev 221, 225 (2015) (noting that neither the approach of the majority nor the dissent in
Sons of Confederate Veterans “aligns with the purported justification for the exemption that
regulation of government speech enjoys from the strictures of the First Amendment”).
88 See, for example, Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at 1216 (cited in note 35) (“Because it is
not clear who the reasonable observer is and precisely what background knowledge she might
have, this test leads to uncertainty and unpredictability.”).
89 See, for example, Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex L Rev 863, 865 (1979) (“Government expression is
critical to the operation of a democratic polity . . . .”); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
UCLA L Rev 565, 603 (1980) (“Indeed it is arguably the function, and perhaps the duty, of
public officials to speak out on all issues of the day . . . .”).
86
87
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Summum, and Sons of Confederate Veterans, in which the relevant expression is
produced in the first instance by nongovernment officials. The Keller rationale
would instead seem to support something like the following test: expression
qualifies as government speech when it is generated by elected or appointed
government officials. This, not coincidentally, is quite close to the “traditional
government agency or official” standard that the Keller Court appeared to
embrace.
Consider next the reductio ad absurdum argument made by the Court in
Rust, Sons of Confederate Veterans, and Tam: how could the government function if
it were required to advocate both sides of every issue or else to stay silent?90
Again, the argument explains why a viewpoint-neutrality requirement should
not apply to every type of government speech: at the very least, the
government must be allowed to urge schoolchildren to “Just Say No” to illegal
drugs and alcohol without also encouraging them to experiment with
depressants, hallucinogens, opiates, and stimulants.91 But the government
could function just fine if Free Speech Clause scrutiny applied to privately
designed ad campaigns, monuments, and license plates—it would just have to
design those ads, monuments, and license plates itself. While it may be efficient
for the government to solicit donations or proposals from private parties under
certain circumstances, the need to do so is certainly not existential.92
Finally, consider the risk that members of the public will misattribute
messages to the government unless the government has the ability to
disassociate itself from views with which it disagrees. This interest in avoiding
misattribution may be a real one, but it arises only because the government
already has begun accepting privately designed monuments, privately designed
license plates, and other forms of privately generated expression. If Pleasant
Grove City accepted no private donations of monuments, it would not need to
disassociate itself from the messages of Summum. If Texas allowed only a
“Lone Star State” license plate, it would not need to disassociate itself from the
Sons of Confederate Veterans. The misattribution problem, in other words, is
a problem of the government’s own making.
This is not to deny that the government may be justified in rejecting a
monument, license plate design, or other form of expression to avoid the risk of
misattribution under some circumstances. But before that argument can
become a persuasive one, we must first identify a compelling reason or set of
reasons why the government should be allowed to solicit private assistance in
See text at notes 28–30.
On the history and (questionable) efficacy of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(D.A.R.E.) program, the source of the well-known “Just Say No” slogan, see Wei Pan &
Haiyan Bai, A Multivariate Approach to Meta-Analytic Review of the Effectiveness of the D.A.R.E. Program,
6 Intl J Envir Rsrch & Pub Health 267 (2009); and Scott O. Lilienfeld & Hal Arkowitz, Why
“Just
Say
No”
Doesn’t
Work,
Scientific
Am
(Jan
1,
2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-just-say-no-doesnt-work.
92 Cf. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the
Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 Iowa L Rev 1259, 1264 (2010) (“[T]here is no real reason why
the government needs to stifle the speech of private persons to get an official government
message across.”).
90
91
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designing monuments, license plates, and other expression that might then be
attributed to it.
Some reasons for allowing the government to reach out for private
assistance are relatively obvious but also relatively weak. No doubt there are
fiscal benefits to outsourcing certain speech production functions. For example,
by accepting privately donated monuments in Pioneer Park, Pleasant Grove
City can beautify a public space without bearing the financial cost of designing
and producing those structures itself. Private parties also might be more skilled
than government officials at designing advertisements, monuments, license
plates, and the like. Yet we doubt that these fiscal and aesthetic benefits are so
significant as to allow the government to engage in viewpoint discrimination
over an ill-defined domain. One might rightly want a more powerful
justification before opening this constitutional Pandora’s box.
A stronger argument is that private participation in the design of
monuments and other items that might be attributed to the government is
important to the process of “collective self-definition” that occurs in successful
democratic polities.93 As Justice Alito notes in Summum, the Statue of Liberty,
the Iwo Jima monument at Arlington National Cemetery, and the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial were all designed by privately designed and funded.94 In
each of these cases, the monument or memorial played an important role in
articulating shared values or reifying collective memories. Something similar
can be said of many other objects with nongovernmental origins. The Ohio
state motto was apparently “the brainchild of a Cincinnati schoolboy.”95 The
drawing of the Roman goddess Diana on the US Postal Service’s Breast
Cancer Research Stamp was the work of a Baltimore artist.96 Examples
abound.
Applying a viewpoint-neutrality argument to these acts of collective selfdefinition would, of course, be self-defeating. (Must the Statue of Liberty be
paired with a Statue of Tyranny?) And excluding everyone except for
“traditional government agencies and officials” from the design of these
collective self-expressions would undermine the entire exercise. Citizen
involvement in the creation of public monuments, mottos, stamps, and so on
allows individuals from various walks of life—artists, architects, and students,
among others—to participate in the process of defining and articulating the
values of the polity. Could that task be left entirely to politicians? Perhaps so,
but only at a considerable (and not purely financial) cost.
But once we depart from the “traditional government agency or
official” standard, several real dangers arise. In addition to the misattribution
93 See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev
267, 283 (1991).
94 Summum, 555 US at 471.
95 See ACLU v Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 243 F3d 289, 318 (6th Cir 2001). The
Sixth Circuit rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the motto—“With God, All
Things Are Possible.” Id.
96 Rachel Warren, Stamping Out Breast Cancer, One Envelope at a Time, Washington Post, July 6,
1998, at C1.
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risk mentioned above (i.e., the risk that individuals will misattribute messages to
the government that the government does not endorse), there is the risk of
misattribution in the opposite direction: a risk that observers will misattribute
the government’s message to private parties. Government speech may be more
persuasive when it is laundered through the mouths of nongovernmental
speakers.97 For example, the government may seek to free-ride off the
credibility of another trusted speaker (e.g., a patient’s physician)98 or may wish
to intervene in the marketplace of ideas without its intervention being
discounted as propaganda.99 In this way, a doctrine meant to facilitate
democratic discourse might instead have a distortionary effect.
A related risk is that if individuals do not identify speech as emanating
from the government, then government officials might not be held accountable
for that expression. This was the concern voiced by Justice Souter in Johanns.
“Democracy,” he wrote, “ensures that government is not untouchable when its
speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who object to
supporting it; if enough voters disagree with what government says, the next
election will cancel the message.”100 But this democratic check works only if
“the putative speech appears to be coming from the government.”101 Voters
are unlikely to punish public officials for speech that they misattribute to a
nongovernmental source.
Electoral accountability is, of course, an imperfect check on the abuse
of the government speech doctrine. If, for example, a majority of voters in a
state are pro-life, then elected officials might be rewarded at the ballot box for
allowing a “Choose Life” license plate while rejecting a “Respect Choice”
design.102 More generally, public officials can use the freedom afforded by the

97 See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 Hastings L J 983, 1009
(2005).
98 Lawrence Lessig uses the example of Rust v Sullivan to illustrate the point:
There the government required (partially) governmentally funded doctors to
say certain things about what methods of family planning were best, and to
refrain from giving women any information about abortion as a method of
family planning. The clear purpose of these regulations was to steer women
away from abortion. But the power of this message was amplified
dramatically by its being delivered, without disclaimer, by a doctor. Out of
the mouth of a doctor, the antiabortion message had a much more powerful
effect than an antiabortion message out of the mouth of Congressman Henry
Hyde. . . . In part because it was hidden that it was the government that was
speaking, the government’s message had a much more powerful effect, if
only by deceiving poor women about the source of the message.
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943, 1017 (1995).
99 Lessig calls this “the Orwell effect”: “when people see that the government or some
relatively powerful group is attempting to manipulate social meaning, they react strongly to
resist any such manipulation.” This, in turn, leads to “a strong incentive for the government to
deliver its message of change while hiding the messenger.” Id.
100 Johanns, 544 US at 575 (Souter, J, dissenting).
101 Id at 578.
102 This example closely tracks the facts of ACLU v Tennyson, 815 F3d 183 (4th Cir 2016). In
that case, the ACLU sued North Carolina for discriminating between pro-life and pro-choice
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government speech doctrine to privilege certain views over others. But while
the threat posed by government speech is present even when members of the
public perceive the relevant speech to be the government’s, the threat is
arguably even more acute when members of the public are confused about a
message’s source.
In any event, whatever apprehensions we might have with regard to
public perception as a factor distinguishing government speech from private
expression, it is not obvious that there is a better alternative out there.103 The
focus on history in Summum, Sons of Confederate Veterans, and Tam leaves
government speech doctrine ill-equipped for technological change. Does, say, a
posting on an agency’s Facebook page or a retweet from an agency’s account
qualify as government speech?104 The fact that no agency posted on Facebook
or tweeted before the twenty-first century cannot be dispositive. As noted, the
emphasis on selectivity in several of the Court’s cases leads to the
counterintuitive result that Free Speech Clause scrutiny is relaxed when
government exerts greater control over the flow of ideas.105 And the Court’s
concern regarding space constraints in Summum does not translate well to other
areas: most of us share the intuition that the Postal Service should be allowed
to choose to print Harriet Tubman’s face on postage stamps and to choose not
to print Adolf Hitler’s, even though there is no binding practical constraint that
prevents the Postal Service from printing both.
In sum, the public perception factor seems to be consonant with the
concerns that underlie the government speech doctrine and applicable—at
least in theory—across a wide range of areas.106 Whether the practical
challenges of applying the public perception factor outweigh its abstract appeal
is a separate question to which we now turn.
2. Can Public Perception Be Measured?
Even if one agrees that public perception is normatively relevant to the
government speech doctrine’s scope, one still might doubt whether the public
license plate designs. The Fourth Circuit initially sided with the ACLU but reversed course
after the Supreme Court held in Sons of Confederate Veterans that specialty license plate designs are
government speech. See id at 184.
103 This is not to say that there is no other possibility for drawing this line. For other
proposals, see Blocher, 52 BC L Rev at 751–66 (cited in note 35) (suggesting that government
speech could be limited to when there are adequate alternatives for private expression, or when
the government would lack adequate alternatives, or when the government affirmatively offers
equal alternatives for discriminated-against viewpoints); Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the
Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68 Ala L Rev 337, 377–392 (2016) (arguing that the
government should be able to create and regulate content on “speech platforms”).
104 Cf. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 Denv U L Rev 899
(2010) (discussing government speech doctrine for new expressive technologies).
105 See text following note 49.
106 Of course, speech that passes this test must still satisfy other limitations such as the
Establishment Clause. See note 57; see also Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 Minn
L Rev 648, 651 (2013) (arguing that the Constitution also prohibits certain forms of
government endorsement, such as “Vote Democrat” or “America is a white nation”).
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perception factor can be operationalized in a nonarbitrary way. The Court’s
record on this score is not inspiring. As one commentator appropriately
complains, the Court has offered “no meaningful guidance for determining
when observers reasonably attribute private expression to the government.”107
Indeterminacy is not, however, an inherent feature of every legal test
that relies on public perception. Social science has over the past several
decades developed a reasonably reliable—though concededly imperfect—tool
for measuring public opinion: the statistical survey.
Courts consult survey evidence in a variety of cases in which public
opinion is relevant to the resolution of a legal dispute.108 In trademark law,
litigants routinely introduce survey evidence to show that a defendant’s use of a
plaintiff’s mark is—or is not—“likely to cause confusion” in the minds of
consumers.109 Thus, if the question in Tam had not been whether the USPTO
could constitutionally reject The Slants’ mark for disparaging persons of Asian
origin but instead whether the mark was likely to cause confusion with the
Boston-based Irish folk band Sláinte,110 the parties might well have introduced
survey evidence to substantiate their claims. Survey evidence also plays an
important role in the resolution of false advertising claims. As one court has
noted, when “we are asked to determine whether a statement acknowledged to
be literally true and grammatically correct nevertheless has a tendency to
mislead,” the court’s own reaction “is at best not determinative and at worst
irrelevant.”111 The relevant question in those cases is: “what does the person to
whom the advertisement is addressed find to be the message?”112 Survey
evidence is the “customary way of proving significant actual deception” in
those cases.113
The use of surveys in court is not, however, limited to trademark and
false advertising cases. Indeed, courts consult survey evidence in the First
Amendment context already. The Supreme Court’s three-part test for
determining whether speech is obscene—and therefore unprotected by the
Free Speech Clause—requires the adjudicator to determine “whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”114 One court has
observed that “[e]xpert testimony based on a public opinion poll is uniquely

See Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at 1219 (cited in note 35).
For a comprehensive overview, see Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey
Research, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 359, 363–67 (National Academies, 3d ed 2011).
109 15 USC §§ 1114(1), 1125(a); see Exxon Corp. v Texas Motor Exchange, 628 F2d 500, 506
(5th Cir 1980) (“Parties often introduce survey evidence in an effort to demonstrate that there is
a likelihood of confusion.”).
110 Sláinte, http://www.slaintetheband.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
111 American Brands, Inc. v R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F Supp 1352, 1357 (SDNY 1976).
112 Id.
113 First Health Group Corp. v United Payors & United Providers, Inc., 95 F Supp 2d 845, 848 (ND
Ill 2000).
114 Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973).
107
108

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090392

12/18/17

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH

23

suited to a determination of community standards,” and “[p]erhaps no other
form of evidence is more helpful or concise.”115
Survey evidence will not be relevant to every First Amendment
question; it is only useful if the legal inquiry focuses on the actual views of
members of the public.116 For example, in deciding whether a regulation of
protected speech serves a compelling government interest, survey evidence
might be of limited utility because the doctrinal inquiry does not depend on
whether members of the public perceive the government interest at stake to be
compelling. The claim that survey evidence should be consulted in government
speech cases is thus contingent on the premise that the distinction between
government speech and private expression should depend on the actual views of
members of the public.
Some have suggested a different yardstick in government speech cases.
For example, Justice Souter said in Summum that “the best approach that occurs
to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would
understand the expression to be government speech.”117 If that is the measure
of government speech, then surveys of less-than-fully-informed observers would
seem to shed little light on doctrinal questions. Yet in our view, Justice Souter’s
“reasonable and fully informed observer” standard has little to recommend it.
The fully informed observer would never misattribute private speech to the
government or vice versa because the observer is, by hypothesis, fully informed
about the message’s source. Our concern—and, we think, the concern that is
normatively relevant to the government speech doctrine—is how a less-thanfully-informed observer might react to a message of muddled origin.
3. Concerns About the Use of Survey Evidence
There are, to be sure, several reasons to pause before embracing survey
evidence in government speech cases. We canvas those concerns here and
explain how some—though not all—can be resolved through real-world
demonstrations.

115 Saliba v State, 475 NE2d 1181, 1185 (Ind Ct App 1985); see also Commonwealth v Trainor,
374 NE2d 1216, 1220 (Mass 1978) (“A properly conducted public opinion survey, offered
through an expert in conducting such surveys, is admissible in an obscenity case if it tends to
show relevant standards in the Commonwealth.”). Such surveys can be conducted without
themselves falling afoul of obscenity laws by phrasing questions in the abstract, such as whether
respondents think it is acceptable for “movie theaters, restricting attendance to adults only, to
show films that depict nudity and actual or pretended sexual activities,” Saliba, 475 NE2d at
1191; see Trainor, 374 NE2d at 1222.
116 This may be true in a number of First Amendment contexts beyond government speech
and obscenity cases. See, for example, Diamond & Koppelman, 60 Md L Rev at 716 (cited in
note 19) (proposing surveys in Establishment Clause cases); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial
Speech, 117 W Va L Rev 867 (2015) (arguing that compelled commercial speech raises no more
constitutional concern than government speech based on the empirical claim about public
perception that “most members of the public recognize government mandated labels and
reports when they see them”).
117 555 US at 487.
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One concern is cost. Our own experience from several such surveys is
that nationally representative panels assembled by survey research firms
generally cost a few dollars per respondent; a thousand-person sample might
thus cost several thousands of dollars (though well below $10,000). This is not a
negligible amount for many litigants; moreover, parties to trademark cases
sometimes spend even larger sums on surveys (including the cost of survey
experts), suggesting that the costs could rise well above the four-digit range.118
Yet even without the use of surveys, government speech litigation is an
expensive enterprise. For example, the religious group Summum requested
attorneys’ fees of more than $69,000 arising from the district court stage of
monument-related litigation parallel to the Pleasant Grove City case in the
mid-2000s.119 More recently, a municipality in California was awarded nearly
$230,000 in attorneys’ fees and court costs resulting from its (successful) defense
against a First Amendment challenge in state court involving government
speech issues.120 That tab only increases at higher levels of appellate review:
hourly rates for prominent members of the Supreme Court bar reportedly fall
in the $1,100 to $1,800 range.121 While none of this meant to trivialize the real
costs that parties—especially less affluent parties—would bear in conducting
rigorous surveys, it does suggest that insofar as the use of survey evidence can
reduce uncertainty in government speech cases, the resulting reduction in other
litigation costs may make a turn toward survey evidence economical in the long
run.
A second concern, and one that is harder to address in the abstract, is
whether members of the public can answer questions about government speech
in a meaningful way.122 Asking an ordinary American whether federal
registration of a trademark “convey[s] a government message”123 may be like
asking him or her whether the Higgs field has a non-zero constant value in
vacuum: the terms of the question are gobbledygook.124 We defer in-depth
discussion of this concern to Part III, where we take stock of the evidence we
gather from a survey of a nationally representative sample. As a preview: We
think our results suggest that individuals do understand these sorts of questions,
and that their intuitions about what does and does not constitute government
speech are not that far off from the intuitions of the justices.
118 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 Cal L Rev 351,
361 & n 53 (2014) (quoting trademark survey expert stating that costs typically fall in $75,000$150,000 range).
119 Summum v Duchesne City, 482 F3d 1263, 1276 (10th Cir 2007).
120 Vargas v City of Salinas, 200 Cal App 4th 1331, 1338 (Cal Ct App 2011).
121 See David Lat, Top Supreme Court Advocates Charge How Much Per Hour?, Above The Law
(Aug. 10, 2015, 4:51 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/top-supreme-court-advocatescharge-how-much-per-hour.
122 See Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at 1228 (cited in note 35) (expressing concern that the
public perception factor will expand government speech due to mistaken attribution of speech
to the government).
123 Tam, 137 S Ct at 1760.
124 Cf. id at 1759 (“[I]t is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea
what federal registration of a trademark means.”).
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A third concern is that even if individuals understand the terms of the
question, their answers will be influenced by doctrinally irrelevant factors. For
example, individuals may be more likely to ascribe expression to the
government if they agree with the message or if they anticipate that politicians
will agree with the message. In that case, reliance on public perception in
government speech cases may serve to shield popular views from Free Speech
Clause scrutiny. To some extent, the government speech doctrine already
produces this result because the views expressed by the government are likely
to be those that a majority holds. We recognize this as a real concern both with
regard to the government speech doctrine in general and with regard to the use
of survey evidence specifically, though we will suggest several ways that surveys
can mitigate this worry.
A fourth concern is in some respects the flipside of the third: not that
individuals will be influenced by doctrinally irrelevant factors, but that
individuals will be influenced by the Court’s own decisions. If the Supreme
Court holds that a particular form of expression constitutes government
speech, then individuals who are aware of the Court’s decision may update
their priors and subsequently say that any similar form of expression also
constitutes government speech. This concern is analogous to the “circularity
problem” in Fourth Amendment law, where the Court relies on “reasonable
expectations of privacy” to determine whether a search has occurred.125 If an
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy are influenced by Fourth
Amendment doctrine, then the Court’s later decisions may be partly
determined by its earlier ones.126
We do not think that the circularity concern is fatal to our proposal. As
a preliminary matter, it is not clear that circularity—if established—would be a
problem for government speech doctrine. As long as individuals identify
government speech as such, then the government cannot launder its message
through private speakers and government officials cannot escape accountability
for government speech. Thus, the checks on government speech that arise
when public perceptions are accurate do not depend on whether public
perceptions are endogenous to judicial decisions.127 Moreover, we find little
evidence that survey respondents pay close attention to Supreme Court
decisions. A majority of respondents reported that they had not heard of
Summum, Sons of Confederate Veterans, and Tam, and those that said they had heard

See Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J, concurring).
See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment
Circularity, 84 U Chi L Rev 1747 (2017).
127 To elaborate: Imagine that the Court held that specialty license plate designs were
government speech, and that members of the public therefore attributed those designs to the
state. Government officials would not be able disguise their own messages as private expression
(because members of the public would understand license plates to be government speech), and
they would have to answer to the electorate for those designs. Now imagine instead that the
Court held that specialty license plate designs were private speech, and that members of the
public therefore did not attribute such designs to the state. Specialty license plate designs would
thus be subject to the viewpoint-neutrality rule that is generally applicable to private
expression.
125
126
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about the cases did no better than a coin flip when asked about the results.128
We also take solace in Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz’s findings
regarding circularity in the Fourth Amendment context: they report only a
slight and temporary change in public perceptions regarding the privacy of cell
phone searches following the Supreme Court’s landmark 2014 decision in Riley
v California.129
A fifth concern relates not to the worry that individuals will be
influenced by past Supreme Court decisions but that they may be influenced
by the upcoming case. If, for example, the citizens of Pleasant Grove City
(population 33,509)130 favor the city’s position in Summum, and if they
understand that identifying statues in Pioneer Park as government speech will
advance the city’s cause, then reliance on survey evidence drawn from Pleasant
Grove City runs the risk of transforming government speech cases into
adjudication by Gallup poll. Yet survey designers can take several steps to allay
this strategic-response concern. One is to ask potential respondents whether
they have heard of the pending case and to exclude those who have. Another is
to draw respondents from a larger (perhaps national) pool, where it is less likely
that individuals will have heard of a case that is especially salient in a particular
jurisdiction. Still another is to vary the facts presented in the survey just enough
that the fact pattern is not immediately recognizable: e.g., instead of asking
whether a privately donated Ten Commandments statue in Pioneer Park is
government speech, the survey might ask whether a privately donated statue
featuring lyrics of the John Lennon song “Imagine” in New York’s Central
Park is government speech.131 Answers to the latter query would still shed light
on the public perception question in Summum: whether members of the public
who observe donated monuments on public land “routinely” interpret them as
conveying a message on the government’s behalf.132
A sixth concern relates to line-drawing: What percentage of
respondents must believe that a particular expression is government speech for
128 Overall, 63% of respondents said they did not know how Summum was resolved; 56%
said the same about Sons of Confederate Veterans; and 59% said that they did not know the result
in Tam. We asked respondents who claimed that they did know how the Court resolved those
cases to tell us whether the expression in question was held to be government speech or private
speech. Of that group, 48% correctly answered “government speech” in Summum; 46%
correctly answered “government speech” in Sons of Confederate Veterans; and 58% correctly
answered “private speech” in Tam.
129 See Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014) (holding that police cannot search digital
information on an arrestee’s cell phone without a warrant); Kugler & Strahilevitz, 84 U Chi L
Rev at 1781 (cited in note 126) (reporting results from multi-wave survey indicating that
expectations of privacy with respect to cell phones returned to pre-Riley levels within one year
after decision).
130 See US Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1,
2016
Population
Estimates,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last
updated May 2017).
131 Cf. Summum, 555 US at 474–75 (discussing the “Imagine” statue as another example of
government speech).
132 See id at 471.
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the speech to qualify as such? A similar question arises in the trademark
confusion context: What percentage of consumers must confuse the defendant’s
products with the plaintiff’s before the defendant will be held liable for
trademark infringement? Figures over 25% will generally support a likelihoodof-confusion finding, though plaintiffs have prevailed on the basis of much
weaker evidence as well.133 One approach is to use a set of controls: examples
of expression that no court would consider to be government speech, as well as
examples that virtually any jurist could consider to be government speech. For
instance, if members of the public are no more likely to say that federal
registration of a trademark constitutes government speech than that a billboard
on private property constitutes government speech, then that fact would be
powerful evidence in support of the Court’s view in Tam.134 By contrast, if
members of the public are no less likely to say that trademark registration
constitutes government speech than that the text engraved on the Lincoln
Memorial does, then that would be equally powerful evidence against the
Court’s position.135 The specific threshold courts demand may depend on how
they balance the dangers of viewpoint discrimination against the harm of
constraining the government’s ability to say what it wants. But in any case, we
think courts will be aided by rigorous evidence of how public perception of the
kind of speech at issue compares with perception of other expression. Resorting
to survey evidence does not remove the need for normative judgment in
interpreting those results.
Last but certainly not least, the usefulness of survey evidence in any
case will depend upon the quality of the survey and its conformance to socialscientific best practices. In federal court, methodological issues generally will be
addressed through adjudication of a Daubert motion on admissibility.136 Federal
judges routinely (if imperfectly) evaluate the reliability of survey methodologies
in the trademark context.137 We see no reason why the challenge of assessing
See McCarthy § 32:188 (cited in note 17).
Diamond and Koppelman offer this suggestion as part of their proposal for using survey
evidence in Establishment Clause cases. See Diamond & Koppelman, 60 Md L Rev at 752
(cited in note 19) (“If respondents were also asked precisely the same questions about a display
that is widely accepted by the courts as indicating no religious endorsement (e.g., a sign saying
‘Welcome to Los Angeles’) and twenty percent reported a perception of state endorsement of
particular religious views, that twenty percent would properly be attributed to the effects of
guessing or the particular wording of the question, and not to the allegedly infringing
display.”).
135 This approach would help address the concern of Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at
1226–34 (cited in note 35), that mistaken perceptions will cause an expansion of the
government speech defense.
136 See Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579, 593-95 (1993) (court should
consider whether evidence relies on falsifiable methodology, whether theory or technique has
been subject to peer review, what the likely error rate is, and whether methodology is generally
accepted in relevant scientific community).
137 See McCarthy § 32:158 (cited in note 17). But see Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and
Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va L Rev 2099, 2131 (2004) (“Consumer surveys are the best evidence of
secondary meaning, but surveys are difficult to design properly and expensive to conduct. . . .
Judges also find it difficult to evaluate survey methodology, especially when confronted with
competing expert testimony, and this increases the likelihood of error.”).
133
134
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the reliability of survey methods will be categorically more difficult in the
government speech context. Of course, the stakes may be higher when survey
evidence will be used to inform a constitutional holding than when used only to
resolve a fact-specific dispute in an individual case, and so the risk of
manipulation may be more acute. But even this much is not clear—the stakes
in cases such as Summum and Sons of Confederate Veterans are in some respects far
greater and in other respects rather paltry compared to a multimillion-dollar
trademark battle. Moreover, manipulation is a risk even under the status quo:
lawyers and jurists who assert that members of the public do or do not perceive
expression to be government speech are no doubt influenced in their claims by
their own preferences regarding the case outcome. The use of survey evidence
has the virtue of subjecting such claims to falsification. When compared with
the current method of assessing public perception—which often entails
armchair speculation colored by ideological motivation—we think survey
evidence is a substantial improvement.

II. Surveying the Public About Government Speech
Some of the concerns limned above cannot be resolved in the abstract.
Most significantly, the concern that individuals will be unable to answer
questions about government speech in a coherent fashion can be refuted only
by demonstration.138 To that end, and to provide a first look at how public
perception interacts with government speech doctrine, we conducted a proofof-concept survey based on the scenarios at issue in Summum, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, and Tam. Here we describe our survey methodology, followed by the
results.

A. Methodology
The survey was administered online in October 2017 to a nationally
representative sample of 1223 respondents recruited by Survey Sampling
International (SSI), as well as in September 2017 to a pilot group of 503
respondents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform.
Appendix Table A1 shows the demographic breakdown of each sample
compared with the US population.139 In this section, we present and discuss
only the SSI results; Appendix Table A3 and Figures A1–A6 show that the
results were similar for the MTurk sample, except that respondents were

See text at notes 123–124.
Table A1 shows that the SSI sample closely matches the US population in terms of
gender, age, race, and ethnicity but is somewhat more highly educated. The MTurk sample
was more male, young, and white (non-Hispanic) than the national population, and even more
highly educated than the SSI sample. For example, the percentage of the population age 18
and over with a bachelor’s degree is 19%, compared with 23% for the SSI sample and 38% for
the MTurk sample.
138
139
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consistently less likely to view all scenarios as government speech. The survey
instrument and datasets are available online.140
Each respondent saw four scenarios involving potential instances of
government speech: (1) a statue in a city park (as in Summum),141 (2) a specialty
state license plate (as in Sons of Confederate Veterans),142 (3) registration of a federal
trademark (as in Tam),143 and (4) a private billboard that is visible from a public
road (as a control that is clearly not government speech). Each scenario was
randomly assigned to a message with a different substantive content: (1) the
Ten Commandments (as in Summum),144 (2) either an atheist or Muslim
message (as a contrasting religious message), (3) either a pro-life or pro-choice
message (as in ACLU v Tennyson, a Fourth Circuit decision applying Sons of
Confederate Veterans),145 and (4) either a corporate (Mickey Mouse) or patriotic
(Abraham Lincoln) message. Thus, for example, one respondent might see the
following four scenarios:
1. A city park contains 15 permanent statues. One of the statues is a Ten
Commandments monument. Do you think the placement of the
monument in the park indicates that the city government endorses the
monument’s message?
2. Drivers may choose between standard state license plates with the state
motto or a variety of specialty license plates. One of the specialty
options is a license plate with a Muslim symbol. Do you think the
availability of this specialty license plate indicates that the state
government endorses the license plate design’s message?
3. A trademark is a word, phrase, or symbol that identifies brands or
products (like Coca-Cola®, Target®, or Nike®). The federal
government registers trademarks (as indicated by the ® symbol). One of
the trademarks that the government has registered is a trademark for a
pro-choice slogan submitted for use on T-shirts. Do you think the
registration of this trademark indicates that the government endorses
the trademark’s message?
4. Disney purchases billboard space from a private company to display a
billboard with a picture of Mickey Mouse. Do you think the visibility of
this billboard from public roads indicates that the government endorses
the billboard’s message?
A second respondent might then see a statue with statements supporting
atheism, a pro-life specialty license plate, an Abraham Lincoln trademark
registration, and a Ten Commandments billboard.
[Before publication, we will upload the final versions of the data and codebook to
https://dataverse.harvard.edu.]
141 555 US at 464.
142 135 S Ct at 2243–44.
143 137 S Ct at 1751.
144 555 US at 464.
145 815 F3d at 184–85; see note 102 above.
140
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The scenarios also randomly varied in the specific details provided: for
the statue, license plate, and trademark conditions, respondents were given (1)
the basic fact patterns listed above, (2) additional information about private
involvement (i.e., that private organizations donated the statues, designed the
license plates, and submitted the trademarks), (3) additional information about
government selectivity (i.e., that the government must approve and has rejected
park statues, license plate designs, or trademark registrations in the past), or
(4) both information about private involvement and government selectivity.
The specific question also randomly varied, with respondents being
asked (1) whether the respondent “associate[s]” the message with the
government,146 (2) whether the government’s action indicates that it “endorses”
the message it issue,147 or (3) whether the government’s action “conveys a
message on [its] behalf.”148 These question forms track the various ways that
the Supreme Court has framed the government speech inquiry. For each
question form, respondents were given the same four choices: “Definitely not,”
“Probably not,” “Definitely yes,” “Probably yes.”149 For example, variations on
the fact pattern involving a Ten Commandments statue in a city park included
the following:
1. A city park contains 15 permanent statues. One of the statues is a Ten
Commandments monument. Do you think the placement of the
monument in the park indicates that the city government endorses the
monument’s message?
2. A city park contains 15 permanent statues, which were donated by
private groups or individuals. One of the statues is a Ten
Commandments monument donated by a private organization. Do you
think the placement of the monument in the park conveys a message on
the city government’s behalf?
3. A city park contains 15 permanent statues. The city government must
approve new statues, and it has rejected proposed statues in the past.
One of the approved statues is a Ten Commandments monument. Do
you associate the monument’s message with the city government?
Table 1 summarizes this variation in scenarios, showing that each
scenario will involve one of four mediums, one of seven messages, one of three

Cf. id, quoting Summum, 555 US at 471 (“[L]icense plates are, essentially, government
IDs. And issuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on their IDs of ‘message[s] with
which they do not wish to be associated.’”).
147 Cf. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct at 2249 (“[A] person who displays a message on a
Texas license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that
message.”).
148 Cf. id, quoting Summum, 555 US at 471 (“‘[P]ersons who observe’ designs on IDs
‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s]
behalf.’”).
149 These four responses were then numerically coded as –1.5, –0.5, 0.5, 1.5, so that each
jump is 1.0 apart on our “government speech” scale.
146
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informational conditions, and one of three question forms.150 To reiterate, each
respondent saw all four mediums (in a random order), each with a different
message. The added information was randomly chosen for each statue, license
plate, and trademark registration scenario independently (so one respondent
might see information about private involvement for all three of these
scenarios, and another might see three different variations). Each respondent
always saw the same question form for all four of their scenarios.
Table 1. Variation in Survey Scenarios
Medium
1. statue in park
(Summum)
2. specialty license plate
(Sons of Confederate
Veterans)
3. trademark
registration (Tam)
4. private billboard

Content
1. 10 Commandments
2. atheism
3. Muslim
4. pro-life
5. pro-choice
6. Mickey Mouse
7. Lincoln

Added Information
1. none
2. private
involvement
3. government
selectivity
4. both

Question Form
1. associate with
gov’t?
2. gov’t
endorses?
3. conveys a
message on
gov’t’s behalf?

Finally, participants were asked for their views on the four messages
they saw—the Ten Commandments, atheism or the Muslim religion, abortion,
and Disney or Lincoln, and for demographic details.

B. Results
Based on Supreme Court government speech jurisprudence, one would
expect the medium of speech to matter significantly to public perceptions, with
the expected ordering from most to least likely to be viewed as government
speech being: (1) statue in the park, (2) specialty license plate, (3) trademark
registration, and (4) private billboard. As discussed in Part I, the Supreme
Court unanimously held in Summum that the placement of a monument in a
city part is government speech.151 The Court split 5–4 in Sons of Confederate

150 The survey contained one additional variation, although the results are not presented
below: We wanted to test whether views on trademark registration varied if the trademark at
issue was one that might be denied registration under the prohibition on “immoral” or
“scandalous” marks in 15 USC § 1052(a), which was at issue in a Federal Circuit case that was
decided after our survey was completed. See In re Brunetti, 2017 WL 6391161 (Fed Cir Dec 15,
2017) (holding the bar on immoral or scandalous marks to be unconstitutional). Thus, for the
half of respondents whose trademark scenario involved a religious message (Ten
Commandments, atheist, or Muslim), these respondents were further randomized into either
the normal condition (as above) or a mark that would likely be viewed as “immoral” or
“scandalous”: “Fuck [the message at issue].” This variation did have large effects on views, but
we were averaging over a small number of respondents (fewer than 80 for the atheism and
Muslim conditions), and the results were not statistically significant. Because there was no
parallel to this “scandalous” condition for the billboard, license plate, and statue conditions, or
for the pro-life, pro-choice, Mickey Mouse, and Lincoln messages, the results from the
scandalous trademark scenarios are omitted from the figures and regressions presented below.
151 555 US at 464. Justice Souter only concurred in the judgment but agreed that the
monument is government speech. Id at 485 (Souter, J, concurring in the judgment).
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Veterans, with Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court holding that specialty
license are government speech,152 and Justice Alito’s dissent arguing that the
public does not in fact associate license plate designs with the state
government.153 In Tam, a unanimous Court held that federal registration does
not make a trademark government speech.154 And presumably a private
billboard visible from a public highway is an even easier case of purely private
speech; Justice Alito’s Sons of Confederate Veterans dissent gave the example of a
state selling advertising space on billboards along public highways as an
example of the kind of absurd scenario that he thought might be government
speech under the majority’s logic.155
As shown in Figure 1, the survey results suggest that the public’s actual
views roughly accord with the Court’s speculations about those views.156
Respondents were mostly likely to view the statue in the park as government
speech—that is, as conveying a message on the government’s behalf or
indicating endorsement or association—and were least likely to view the
private billboard as government speech. In the middle, license plates were
more likely to be viewed as government speech than federally registered
trademarks, but the difference is small; neither mean is statistically significantly
different from zero, although the difference between the means is significant
(one-tailed p = 0.049). While the Sons of Confederate Veterans and Tam majority
opinions asserted that the public views the government to be associated with
specialty license plates but not registered trademarks,157 these results suggest
that that empirical question is closer than the Court acknowledged.

135 S Ct at 2253.
Id at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting).
154 137 S Ct at 1760. Other portions of Justice Alito’s opinion attracted only a plurality of
justices, but the discussion of government speech in Part III–A was unanimous.
155 135 S Ct at 2256 (Alito, J, dissenting).
156 Figure 1 shows the mean of the “government speech” variable, as described above in
note 149 (averaging over the three question forms, with the four responses to each question
coded as –1.5, –0.5, 0.5, and 1.5), with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals. The
regression results in Table A2, in which the billboard is the omitted medium, show that this
effect of variation in medium on public perceptions persists when controlling for other factors.
157 See text at notes 71–74, 80–81.
152
153
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Figure 1. Effect of varying medium of speech on public perception as government speech

As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has also emphasized the
relevance of government selectivity in evaluating whether something constitutes
government speech. In Summum, it was important that cities “have exercised
selectivity” and have “select[ed] the monuments that portray what they view as
appropriate for the place in question.”158 This became the third factor of the
Sons of Confederate Veterans test: whether the state “maintains direct control over
the messages conveyed.”159
Figure 2 shows that the public, like the Court, is more likely to view a
message as government speech when it is clear that the government is selective
in allowing messages of that variety to be conveyed. Evidence that the
government is selective in which statues, specialty license plates, or registered
trademarks it allows made it more likely that respondents would view the
scenario they encountered as conveying a message on the government’s behalf
or indicating government endorsement of or association with the message.
Evidence that these messages were submitted by private parties seemed
somewhat less important: it caused a small and statistically insignificant
increase in whether respondents viewed the message as government speech,
though a larger decrease for the MTurk pilot sample.160 But information about
selectivity, whether combined with information about private involvement or
not, caused a large and statistically significant increase in whether the message
was viewed in government speech.161
555 US at 471–71.
135 S Ct at 2249.
160 Appendix Figure A2 shows that for the MTurk sample, information about private
involvement decreased the likelihood that the message would be viewed as government speech
by just over 0.1, one-tailed p = 0.07.
161 The difference in the mean government speech outcome variable for respondents who
saw information about selectivity vs. not was 0.15 (p < 0.01). For the MTurk sample, it was
0.25 (p < 0.01).
158
159
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Figure 2. Effect of providing additional information about private involvement or
government selectivity for the statue, license plate, and trademark scenarios

While medium and government selectivity are clearly relevant to the
government speech question under existing doctrine, the viewpoint expressed by
the message is not. Indeed, it would be ironic for a Court that generally
prohibits viewpoint discrimination to have a doctrine that is viewpoint
discriminatory.
But our results show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the message (as
distinct from the medium) does affect perceptions of whether the message is
government speech. Figure 3 shows the response across the seven messages we
tested, averaging across the other sources of variation. Respondents were most
likely to view scenarios as government speech when the message involved
Abraham Lincoln, and were least likely to ascribe Mickey Mouse messages to
the government. Interestingly, respondents were more likely to credit the
government with abortion-related messages—particularly pro-life messages—
than religious ones. Among the religious messages, the Ten Commandments
was the most likely to be considered government speech, but the difference
between it and the atheist messages was significant only at the 10% level.
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Figure 3. Effect of varying content on public perception as government speech

We think there are at least two reasons that the message itself might
affect public perceptions. First, it might simply seem more plausible that the
government would be endorsing one message over the other. For example,
Abraham Lincoln is already the subject of well-known examples of government
speech such as the Lincoln Memorial, Mount Rushmore, the five-dollar bill,
and—most ubiquitously—the penny. In contrast, it might seem less likely that
the government would endorse a corporate message like Disney’s Mickey
Mouse. And respondents who recall something about separation of church and
state from their high school civics classes might be skeptical that religious
messages could constitute government speech.
Second, respondents might be more willing to associate messages with
the government when they agree with those messages themselves. Lincoln is
one of the universally liked US presidents;162 atheists and Muslims are the
religious groups toward which the US public holds the most negative views.163
To test this second hypothesis, we also asked respondents at the end of the
survey for their views on the messages at issue in the four scenarios they saw.
Table A2 shows that for the nationally representative SSI respondents, this
measure of “Agreement” with the message was positively correlated with the
See Washington, Lincoln Most Popular Presidents: Nixon, Bush Least Popular, Rasmussen
Reports
(July
4,
2007),
at
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/people2/2007/washington_lincol
n_most_popular_presidents_nixon_bush_least_popular (reporting that Lincoln is viewed
favorably by 92% of the general public, second only to George Washington at 94%); Robert
W. Merry, America’s Greatest President: Abraham Lincoln, Natl Interest (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-greatest-president-abraham-lincoln-12957
(“Whenever academics and scholars tickle their fancy by putting forth yet another poll of
historians on presidential rankings, there is little doubt about which president will top the list—
Abraham Lincoln.”).
163 See Americans Express Increasingly Warm Feelings Toward Religious Groups, Pew Research
Center (Feb. 15, 2017), at http://www.pewforum.org/2017/02/15/americans-expressincreasingly-warm-feelings-toward-religious-groups.
162
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assessment of whether it is government speech, and that this correlation is
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is driven by respondents who
felt the most strongly about the message—those who stated that they had
“extremely” or “moderately” negative or positive views—and the results for
these respondents are shown in Figure 4.164

Figure 4. Effect of respondents’ views on the message

Finally, note that for all of the above results, the responses from our
three question forms were combined into one average “government speech”
outcome variable. Figure 5 separates the results from the three questions and
illustrates that the precise question wording can have a large effect on
responses. As explained above, respondents were asked (1) whether they
associate the message with the government (e.g., “Do you associate the specialty
license plate design’s message with the state government?”); (2) whether they
think the government endorses the message (e.g., “Do you think the availability
of this specialty license plate indicates that the state government endorses the
license plate design’s message?”); or (3) whether they think the scenario conveys a
message on the government’s behalf (e.g., “Do you think the availability of this
specialty license plate conveys a message on the state government’s behalf?”).
Figure 5 shows that all else equal, respondents are less likely to say that
they associate a given message with the government than that the government
endorses the message or that the scenario conveys a message on the
government’s behalf, an effect that was even stronger for the MTurk sample (as
shown in Appendix Figure A5). We also observed a significant difference
between the “conveys a message” and “endorses” responses, but only for the
SSI sample. Although the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
public perception in government speech cases, it has not clarified which (if any)
of these phrasings is the relevant question. Our results illustrate, at the very

164

This effect was not observed for the MTurk respondents.
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least, that government speech survey designers must pay attention to these
differences in wording.

Figure 5. Effect of varying question form

In sum, our survey results support some of the Supreme Court’s
speculations about public perceptions of government speech, but they also
show that the public can be swayed by details that should not matter to the
doctrinal outcome, such as the content of the message at issue. As we will
discuss further in Part III, we view this as a feature of survey evidence, not a
bug: by relying on surveys that isolate the effect of a variable at interest from
other distracting details, justices can prevent government speech doctrine from
systematically favoring more sympathetic views.

III. The Promise and Pitfalls of Survey Evidence
What, if anything, can we conclude from these results about the use of
survey evidence in government speech cases—or, more generally, about the
current state of the Court’s government speech jurisprudence? While
recognizing that reasonable minds may draw different inferences from the
same data, we emerge from this exercise with five key takeaways.
The first, and perhaps most important, is that public perceptions of
government speech roughly track the justices’ speculations, except that Tam is a
closer case from the audience’s perspective than it is from the justices’. The
ordinal ranking for medium of expression—with statues in public parks as the
most likely to be considered government speech, followed by license plates,
followed by federal registration of trademarks—matches the results in Summum
(9-0), Sons of Confederate Veterans (5-4), and Tam (0-8). While we see this as an
encouraging sign that members of the public can answer questions about
government speech in a reasonably coherent way, others might think this is a
strike against our proposal: after all, if the justices are already doing a
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reasonably good job of estimating public perceptions of government speech
based on intuition alone, why do we need surveys?
Our response is twofold. First, while the justices’ conclusions are
broadly consistent with our survey results, their explanations for those
conclusions are—as emphasized in Part I—rather flimsy. Insofar as respect for
the judiciary depends on well-reasoned opinions, the use of survey evidence
can improve upon judicial ipse dixit even if it does not alter results. Second,
while the justices were unanimous in Summum and Tam, lower court judges
were not: the grant of certiorari in Summum was the outgrowth of a circuit
split,165 and the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision below in Tam was
divided.166 Likewise, while a slight majority of the Court in Sons of Confederate
Veterans and a slight majority of our respondents concluded that specialty
license plate designs are government speech, six circuits came out the other
way,167 and the issue continues to spark disagreement among lower court
judges.168 The lower courts have also struggled to apply the public perception
factor in other cases since Sons of Confederate Veterans in contexts ranging from
exhibits169 or rallies170 on government property to actions by public schools.171
See Summum v Pleasant Grove City, 483 F3d 1044 (10th Cir 2007).
See In re Tam, 808 F3d 1321, 1375 (Fed Cir 2015) (Dyk, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[I]t has been questioned whether federal registration imparts the
‘imprimatur’ of the federal government on a mark, such that registration could be permissibly
restricted as government speech. I believe that such action is justified.”).
167 See Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at 1216 n 129 (cited in note 35) (collecting citations).
168 In ACLU v Tennyson, discussed at note 102, the dissenting judge argued that the
“specifics” of North Carolina’s specialty license plate program “must impact the way the North
Carolina public views its specialty plates” and distinguish the resulting perceptions from those
in Texas. 815 F3d 183, 188 (4th Cir 2016) (Wynn, J, dissenting). And state supreme courts
have disagreed on whether personalized vanity license plates are government speech. Compare
Commissioner of Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v Vawter, 45 NE3d 1200, 1202, 1205 (Ind 2015)
(yes), with Mitchell v Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration, 148 A3d 319, 328 (Md 2016) (no).
169 Compare Vista-Graphics, Inc. v Virginia Department of Transportation, 682 Fed Appx 231, 236
(4th Cir 2017) (“[W]e are confident that the public will associate the [informational tourism
guides at state rest areas] with the Commonwealth of Virginia, regardless whether the
government itself produces the guides.”); and United Veterans Memorial & Patriotic Association of the
City of New Rochelle v City of New Rochelle, 72 F Supp 3d 468, 474–75 (SDNY 2014) (“[I]t is
obvious that [a flag flying at a city-owned armory] would be regarded as government speech”
because “flags, like monuments, are reasonably interpreted ‘as conveying [a] message on the
property owner’s behalf.’”), affd 615 F Appx 693 (2d Cir 2015), with Freedom from Religion
Foundation v Abbott, 2016 WL 7388401, *5 (WD Tex) (“[A] reasonable person would not find the
[Texas State] Capitol exhibits are the voice of the government.”).
170 Compare A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v Jewell, 153 F Supp 3d 395, 412 (DDC 2016) (holding
that government speech doctrine should shield the Trump Presidential Inaugural Committee’s
exclusive access to areas traditionally used for inaugural protests because “the Inauguration
Ceremony and Parade are ‘closely identified in the public mind with’ the United States
government”), affd in part on other grounds, A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v Basham, 845 F3d 1199
(DC Cir 2017), with Higher Society of Indiana v Tippecanoe County, 858 F3d 1113, 1118 (7th Cir
2017) (“[R]easonable people would not attribute to the government the views expressed at
protests and rallies on government property.”).
171 Compare Mech v School Board of Palm Beach County, 806 F3d 1070 (11th Cir 2015)
(concluding that observers would believe that a public school had endorsed banners for private
businesses hung on its fences on the Summum theory that “government property is ‘often closely
165
166
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The question of whether members of the public perceive expression to be
government speech is not one that can be answered reliably on the basis of
judicial intuition. The fact that the Court is 3-for-3, by our accounting, should
not be grounds for great confidence in its ability to take the public’s pulse.
A second takeaway is that, somewhat to our surprise, the fact that
expression is generated by private parties does not seem to reduce the
likelihood that members of the public will perceive that expression to be
government speech. This finding provides some validation for the Court’s
decision to jettison the “traditional government agencies and officials” standard
from Keller. Meanwhile, government selectivity does seem to influence whether
members of the public perceive speech to be the government’s. This finding
suggests a way to harmonize the second and third factors in the three-factor
Sons of Confederate Veterans test: factor three (whether the government can and
does reject messages on the basis of content) is normatively relevant because it
feeds into factor two (public perception). Indeed, the three-factor Sons of
Confederate Veterans test arguably can be boiled down to a single inquiry: whether
members of the public have understood and continue to understand the
expression in question to be government speech.
A third takeaway is that message matters: members of the public are
much more likely to perceive a Lincoln monument, license plate, or mark to be
government speech than, say, an otherwise equivalent expression bearing the
visage of Mickey Mouse. Somewhat more disconcertingly, members of the
public are more likely to perceive speech to be the government’s when they
approve of that speech personally. The finding that members of the public
appear to be influenced by this doctrinally irrelevant factor might be
considered a problem for our proposal.
We see the matter differently. Judges, too, are influenced by the
message as well as the medium in government speech cases. Consider the
license plate controversy. When holding that license plates were government
speech meant that the state could exclude a pro-life message, Republicanappointed judges on the Seventh,172 Eighth,173 and Ninth Circuits174 said that
license plates were private speech. When holding that license plates were
government speech meant that the state could exclude a pro-choice message,
Republican-appointed judges on the Sixth Circuit said that license plates were
identified in the public mind with the government unit that owns the land’”); and Cambridge
Christian School v Florida High School Athletic Association, 2017 WL 2458314, *8 (MD Fla) (asserting
that use of public stadium loudspeaker for a pre-game prayer led by a Christian school in the
state football playoffs would “be perceived as state endorsement of [the school’s] religious
message”), with Gerlich v Leath, 152 F Supp 3d 1152 (SD Iowa 2016) (dismissing anecdotal
evidence that the public associated a student group’s marijuana-related T-shirt design with the
university “because the record shows almost no reaction to the Article [featuring the T-shirt]
from the general public”), affd, 861 F3d 697 (8th Cir 2017).
172 See Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v White, 547 F3d 853 (7th Cir 2008). Judge Terrence Evans, a
Clinton appointee, joined his co-panelists in Choose Life Illinois, marking a departure from the
partisan voting pattern observed elsewhere.
173 See Roach v Stouffer, 560 F3d 860 (8th Cir 2009).
174 See Arizona Life Coalition Inc. v Stanton, 515 F3d 956 (9th Cir 2008).
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government speech (over the dissent of their Democrat-appointed colleague).175
When the question came up in the Confederate flag context, every court of
appeals judge who was initially appointed to the federal bench by a
Democratic President and who weighed in on the question voted in favor of
the view that license plates are government speech (in which case the
Confederate flag plate could be excluded); all but one of the 10 court of appeals
judges initially appointed to the bench by a Republican President who weighed
in on the question voted in favor of the view that license plates are private
speech.176 The Supreme Court is not immune from ideologically inflected
voting patterns on questions of government speech either. With the exception
of Justice Thomas, who voted with the majority in Sons of Confederate Veterans,
the rest of the Court followed the same partisan pattern as the circuits:
Democratic-appointed justices voted for the view that license plates are
government speech (and thus that Texas can exclude the Confederate plate),
while Republican-appointed justices took the opposite position.
The fact that ideology influences judicial decisionmaking is nothing
new. Yet for those who think that the ideological content of the message should
not influence the result in government speech cases, survey evidence provides a
promising path. For example, surveys can ask different subsets of respondents
about pro-life and pro-choice plates—or about plates featuring the
Confederate flags and plates featuring the face of Lincoln—in order to
disentangle the effect of medium from the effect of message. And while we are
not so naïve as to think that this strategy will mean that government speech
cases can be resolved in an ideological vacuum, we think that well-constructed
surveys can do some work in counteracting the effect of ideology on
government speech decisions.
A fourth takeaway is that the question matters. The Supreme Court
toggles among three different versions of the government speech inquiry:
whether the public associates expression with the government;177 whether the
public understands the government to be endorsing expression;178 and whether
expression conveys a message on the government’s behalf.179 We find that
respondents are more likely to say that the government “conveys” a message
than that it “endorses” a message or that they “associate” a message with the
government. This might strike some readers as surprising: “endorse” and
“convey” are arguably stronger verbs than “associate.” On the other hand, we
can imagine circumstances in which a speaker might convey a message and yet
the listener would not associate the speaker with that message. (Mundanely: If
See ACLU of Tennessee v Bredesen, 441 F3d 370, 379–80 (6th Cir 2006).
See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v Commissioner of the Virginia DMV, 305 F3d 241 (4th Cir
2002) (denying rehearing en banc); Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v Vandergriff, 759
F3d 388 (5th Cir 2014), rev’d sub nom, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct 2239.
177 See Summum, 555 US at 471 (“associated”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct at 2251
(“associates”); Tam, 137 S Ct at 1760 (“associates”).
178 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct at 2249 (“endorsed”); Tam, 137 S Ct at 1758
(“endorsing”).
179 See Summum, 555 US at 471–72 (“convey”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct at 2246
(“convey”); Tam, 137 S Ct at 1760 (“convey”).
175
176
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Daniel asks Lisa what time it is, Lisa might “convey” the answer “noon” but
Daniel would not therefore “associate” Lisa with the lunch hour.)
Which of these verbs best captures the government speech inquiry
depends in part on what interests the government speech doctrine is intended
to protect. Insofar as the doctrine serves to shield the government from the risk
that it will be associated with messages that it disavows, then asking whether
respondents “associate” a message with the government would seem
appropriate. Insofar as the doctrine serves to ensure that the government
cannot launder its message through the mouths of private speakers, then asking
whether the government “conveys” a message via the expression in question
might be the better way to frame the inquiry. All of this serves to underscore
the point that precision about the normative basis for government speech
doctrine will inform the design of surveys.
Fifth and finally, we think our results should allay concerns that reliance
on public perception in government speech cases will lead to a shrinking of
First Amendment protections.180 Members of the public are not systematically
more likely than judges to perceive speech as emanating from the government.
Moreover, the Court’s decisions do not appear to have a profound effect on
public perception. Just over two years after the Court held in Sons of Confederate
Veterans that license plate designs are government speech, our respondents were
close to evenly divided on the question. And only three months after the Court
held in Tam that trademark registration is not government speech, a substantial
minority of respondents maintained the opposite view. The fear of a selfreinforcing cycle in which Court decisions drive the public to perceive more
and more expression as government speech is not borne out here. While
subsequent surveys will be useful in determining whether public perception is
consistent across time, our results suggest that members of the public
understand the category of government speech to be bounded.
Our results do not, of course, resolve all questions about public
perception of government speech, nor do they allay all concerns about the use
of survey evidence in government speech cases. We hope this is a first step
toward a richer understanding of how the public perceives expression in the
gray area between government and private speech, but ours is most certainly
not the final word. Among other avenues of inquiry, future research might
examine the role of government selectivity in more detail. Does it matter if over
99% of messages are approved by the relevant government entity (as for
trademark registrations) versus 50% or less than 1%? Does it matter if the
respondents are given a sense of the range of approved messages—such as
knowing that the government has approved both pro-life and pro-choice
messages—rather than only being asked to evaluate a single message? Future
research also might examine whether public perceptions are consistent across
jurisdictions and regions. Further data on this question could help parties and
180 See Papandrea, 110 Nw U L Rev at 1234 (cited at note 35) (“Under well-established
First Amendment principles, the government is required to support the speech of private
speakers. A focus on reasonable observers who erroneously believe this tolerance operates as
endorsement threaten the future of free speech rights in this country.”).
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courts assess whether the appropriate population for surveys used in litigation is
local, regional, or national.

IV. Conclusion
It has been nearly a decade since a majority of the Court embraced
public perception as a factor distinguishing government speech from private
expression, and the justices have yet to offer a justification for that doctrinal
turn or a reliable method for determining what public perceptions actually are.
This article has sought to plug both holes. We have argued that a narrower
conception of government speech—along the lines of the “traditional
government agencies and officials” standard suggested in Keller—would fail to
capture certain acts of collective self-definition that are important to the
development of a democratic community. At the same time, a public
perception test serves to police against message laundering while also ensuring
that elected officials remain politically accountable for government speech.
And although the Court’s application of the public perception has so far been
ad hoc, we have suggested that reliance on survey evidence can channel and
constrain the government speech inquiry so that case outcomes are determined
by more than judicial guesswork.
As a proof of concept, we have conducted what is to our knowledge the
first survey of a nationally representative sample on the subject of government
speech. Our results provide a factual basis for certain elements of the Court’s
government speech jurisprudence. Members of the public are indeed more
likely to attribute statues in a public park to the government than to do the
same with respect to trademark registration. Moreover, the fact that private
parties generated a message does not significantly affect perceptions of
government speech, though the fact that the government exercises selectivity
with respect to messages does. We also find that members of the public—
perhaps no differently than judges—are influenced by the content of messages
as well as the medium, and that they are more likely to attribute to the
government messages with which they agree.
Our results do not support calls for a revolution in government speech
doctrine. More modestly, we suggest that survey evidence can supplant judicial
ipse dixit in the application of the public perception factor, and that surveys can
serve as checks on the government speech doctrine’s expansion. To be sure,
distinguishing government speech from private expression will remain a
difficult line-drawing exercise even with the help of survey data. But at the very
least, the use of survey evidence can transform that line-drawing exercise from
one that depends on judicial imagination into an empirically grounded inquiry.
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Appendix
Table A1. Demographic Characteristics

Gender
Male
Female
Age
18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65+
Race/Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
Latino or Hispanic
Black or African-American
Asian or Pacific Islander
Native American
2 or More Races or Other
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college; no degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate or professional

# in MTurk
Sample
N=503

% of
MTurk
Sample

# in SSI
Sample
N=1223

% of SSI
Sample

% of US
181
Population

278
225

55%
45%

580
643

47%
53%

49%
51%

41
203
107
85
49
18

8%
40%
21%
17%
10%
4%

196
226
219
226
177
179

16%
18%
18%
18%
14%
15%

13%
18%
17%
18%
16%
18%

394
23
32
37
0
17

78%
5%
6%
7%
0%
3%

786
173
150
55
8
51

64%
14%
12%
4%
<1%
4%

62%
17%
12%
5%
<1%
2%

2
52
122
59
191
55
22

<1%
10%
24%
12%
38%
11%
4%

20
277
325
129
286
137
49

2%
23%
27%
11%
23%
11%
4%

12%
29%
19%
10%
19%
8%
3%

181 See 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, US Census Bureau (2015), at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_
5YR_DP05&src=pt (gender, age, and race/ethnicity); Educational Attainment in the United States:
2016,
US
Census
Bureau
(2016),
at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailedtables.html (education).
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Table A2. Regression Results for SSI Sample

Medium
Statue
License Plate
Trademark

1

2

3

4

5

0.551***
(0.0422)
0.365***
(0.0429)
0.290***
(0.0473)

0.550***
(0.0418)
0.364***
(0.0426)
0.272***
(0.0470)

0.549***
(0.0418)
0.364***
(0.0426)
0.271***
(0.0469)

0.550***
(0.0403)
0.364***
(0.0411)
0.267***
(0.0448)

0.549***
(0.0403)
0.364***
(0.0411)
0.266***
(0.0447)

0.337***
(0.0599)
0.191***
(0.0590)
0.139**
(0.0600)
0.103*
(0.0535)
0.0725
(0.0617)
0.0254
(0.0632)

0.326***
(0.0598)
0.257***
(0.0609)
0.177***
(0.0607)
0.0970*
(0.0534)
0.125**
(0.0627)
0.0969
(0.0656)

0.349***
(0.0577)
0.195***
(0.0565)
0.148**
(0.0575)
0.108**
(0.0510)
0.0768
(0.0591)
0.0269
(0.0605)

0.340***
(0.0576)
0.251***
(0.0585)
0.181***
(0.0583)
0.103**
(0.0509)
0.122**
(0.0603)
0.0883
(0.0629)

0.291***
(0.0376)
0.138***
(0.0382)

0.286***
(0.0375)
0.135***
(0.0381)

0.276***
(0.0362)
0.122***
(0.0368)

0.272***
(0.0361)
0.119***
(0.0367)

-0.0134***
(0.000953)
-0.0839***
(0.0309)
0.0887***
(0.0331)
0.0692***
(0.00957)
0.00981
(0.0102)
-0.0140
(0.0786)
4585
0.127

0.0294***
(0.00862)
-0.0134***
(0.000950)
-0.0825***
(0.0309)
0.0896***
(0.0330)
0.0673***
(0.00955)
0.00935
(0.0102)
-0.0563
(0.0792)
4585
0.130

Content
Lincoln
Pro-Life
Pro-Choice
Ten Cs
Muslim
Atheism
Question Form
Convey Message
Endorse
Other
Agreement

0.0343***
(0.00899)

Age
Female
Nonwhite
Liberal
Education
Constant
N
2
R

-0.320***
(0.0312)
4585
0.037

-0.584***
(0.0550)
4585
0.058

-0.633***
(0.0558)
4585
0.062

Notes: The billboard is the omitted medium, Mickey Mouse is the omitted message, and the
association question is the omitted question form. N = 4585 because all 1223 respondents
saw four scenarios, and then the 307 respondents who saw a “scandalous” trademark were
dropped. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A3. Regression Results for Mechanical Turk Sample

Medium
Statue
License Plate
Trademark

1

2

3

4

5

1.107***
(0.0565)
0.738***
(0.0598)
0.400***
(0.0640)

1.102***
(0.0555)
0.735***
(0.0585)
0.402***
(0.0641)

1.102***
(0.0556)
0.733***
(0.0586)
0.400***
(0.0641)

1.102***
(0.0551)
0.735***
(0.0582)
0.406***
(0.0632)

1.102***
(0.0551)
0.733***
(0.0583)
0.404***
(0.0632)

0.520***
(0.0817)
0.410***
(0.0825)
0.307***
(0.0817)
0.352***
(0.0726)
0.299***
(0.0856)
0.0699
(0.0827)

0.532***
(0.0820)
0.359***
(0.0880)
0.304***
(0.0818)
0.340***
(0.0732)
0.264***
(0.0878)
0.0498
(0.0829)

0.539***
(0.0809)
0.419***
(0.0823)
0.316***
(0.0817)
0.362***
(0.0725)
0.314***
(0.0864)
0.0776
(0.0829)

0.550***
(0.0813)
0.373***
(0.0879)
0.313***
(0.0818)
0.351***
(0.0731)
0.283***
(0.0885)
0.0597
(0.0830)

0.226***
(0.0546)
0.232***
(0.0527)

0.225***
(0.0545)
0.231***
(0.0528)

0.204***
(0.0547)
0.217***
(0.0527)

0.203***
(0.0546)
0.216***
(0.0527)

-0.00562***
(0.00186)
0.0517
(0.0447)
0.0563
(0.0549)
0.0294**
(0.0132)
-0.0449***
(0.0167)
-1.033***
(0.112)
1889
0.210

-0.0197
(0.0128)
-0.00545***
(0.00186)
0.0529
(0.0447)
0.0565
(0.0551)
0.0295**
(0.0131)
-0.0448***
(0.0167)
-1.014***
(0.112)
1889
0.211

Content
Lincoln
Pro-Life
Pro-Choice
Ten Cs
Muslim
Atheism
Question Form
Convey Message
Endorse
Other
Agreement

-0.0219*
(0.0129)

Age
Female
Nonwhite
Liberal
Education
Constant
N
2
R

-0.906***
(0.0377)
1889
0.161

-1.346***
(0.0673)
1889
0.197

-1.316***
(0.0693)
1889
0.199

Notes: The billboard is the omitted medium, Mickey Mouse is the omitted message, and the
association question is the omitted question form. N = 1889 because all 503 respondents saw
four scenarios, and then the 123 respondents who saw a “scandalous” trademark were
dropped. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Figures A1–A5. Replication of Figures 1–5 for Mechanical Turk Sample

Figure A1. Medium

Figure A2. Additional information

Figure A3. Content

Figure A4. View on the content

Figure A5. Question form
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